The “ascendancy” of the Pakistan Army in domestic politics is not a recent event.
Martial law was declared in 1958, but the birth of our hybrid system goes further back to 1954 when the then Army Chief, General Ayub Khan, was also appointed as defense minister. This appointment spelled the end of civilian control of the Armed Forces through the Defense Ministry and, over the years, key posts in this Ministry have been manned by serving and retired defense personnel.
Simultaneously with the above appointment, Pakistan entered regional defense pacts, namely, SEATO and CENTO, in which the U.S. was the dominant partner, and started receiving large quantities of military aid, especially tanks. This led to a direct and still-continuing relationship between GHQ and the Pentagon, independent of the relationship between our Foreign Office and the U.S. State Department.
In August 1998, when the U.S. fired missiles at Osama bin Laden’s camp in Afghanistan from their submarines in the Arabian Sea, our Army Chief—not the foreign minister, Prime Minister, or President—General Jehangir Karamat was informed by the ranking general in the Pentagon a few minutes before the salvo overflew Pakistan’s airspace.
Similarly, when General Pervez Musharraf executed his coup in October 1999, the first U.S. official he got in touch with was CENTCOM Commander General Anthony Zinni, and not the White House or State Department. Some of our serving officers train at American military installations. Some of theirs train at our installations. The contacts endure. This GHQ-Pentagon relationship has now been elevated to a direct high-level contact between Field Marshal Asim Munir as Chief of Defense Forces and the Commander-in-Chief of the American Armed Forces, President Donald Trump.
To appreciate the impact of this development on our domestic politics, it is necessary to look at some numbers. The numerical strength of our Armed Forces is 660,000, including 560,000 in the Army. It has an officer corps of about 33,000. The top level comprises, apart from the Field Marshal, 30 lieutenant generals, over 180 major generals, and (possibly) 800 brigadiers. The paramilitary forces number around 185,000. The deployment is nationwide.
The estimated strength of the civilian setup is 3,200,000, including 1,000,000 in the divisions and autonomous bodies of the federal government, and the rest in the provinces. More than 95% are in the non-gazetted grades 1 to 16. The number of officers in grade 20 and above, equivalent to brigadiers and generals, is about 2,000.
The effective governance level of Pakistan vests in slightly more than 1,000 senior officers of the Armed Forces and about 2,000 equivalents in the civilian bureaucracy, but there is a difference.
The Armed Forces come under a strictly disciplined command structure headed by a Field Marshal, who is the commander of all three services and the Strategic Forces. Neither Parliament nor the Provincial Assemblies nor the 200 judges of the Superior Courts have any real say in matters relating to the Armed Forces, who speak with one voice through Inter-Services Public Relations.
On the other hand, control over the civil bureaucracy is divided between the Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers, among many others, and is also subject to legislative and judicial oversight—sometimes helpful, sometimes not—that is inevitably the cause of delays in decision-making and implementation. The output is disparate.
The primary domestic problem facing the Army is terrorist activity fueled by India and supported by Afghanistan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces. The Army and the Air Force got a huge boost in popularity within the country and in prestige abroad as a result of their success in the conflict with India last May. The acclaim that the Field Marshal achieved as Commander of Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos has been further enhanced by his visible role in brokering peace talks between the U.S. and Iran. This much-applauded role of the Army and its Chief will hopefully lead to greater public acceptance and assistance in antiterrorist activities, especially now that opposition parties have also voiced their support of the incipient peace process. Of special importance will be the attitude and policies of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government.
The Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and mandarins of our Foreign Office share the credit for brokering the talks, but this historic achievement may not have much impact on domestic issues that face the civilian establishment.
These domestic problems include rising levels of poverty, unemployment (especially among the youth), and inflation of food and transport prices, as well as inadequate health and education services. Given the inability to finance even nondevelopment budgetary expenditures and the slowdown in the activities of the private sector, which employs 93% of our 65 million workforce, it is difficult to see how the acclaim, whether at home or abroad, will help in resolving or ameliorating these issues except to the extent that it leads to a greater degree of economic and political stability within the country and larger volumes of foreign investment.
In November 2022, at the time of Army chief General Qamar Bajwa’s retirement, the senior-most lieutenant general was Asim Munir. He possessed all the experience necessary for promotion to four-star rank and appointment as Chief of Army Staff. This process has two distinct parts, though covered by a single notification. The first is promotion from the rank of lieutenant general to that of a four-star general. This is within the discretionary powers of the Prime Minister and does not require the consent of the President. The second part is the appointment of the promoted general as Chief of Army Staff by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister in accordance with Article 243 of the Constitution. President Arif Alvi signed the notification appointing him Army chief when it was made clear that he could not delay or stop his promotion.
In November 2024, Gen. Munir’s term was extended from three years to five. In May 2025, he was elevated to the rank of Field Marshal after the success of Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos under his command. The Field Marshal partnered with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in responding positively to the call of President Trump to cease hostilities. Trump responded by inviting the Field Marshal to lunch with him at the White House and by asking our Prime Minister to address the Gaza Peace Conference at Sharm-ul-Sheikh, giving a huge boost to the international status of both. India denied Trump’s role and continues to pay the cost of doing so. This was followed by the 27th Amendment to the Constitution in November 2025 in terms of which the Field Marshal has been declared a national hero and concurrently the Chief of Defense Forces, and on whose recommendation the Prime Minister is to appoint the Commander of the National Strategic Forces. In December 2025, the Field Marshal’s term of office was extended to the end of 2030.
This is the background in which the U.S. accepted the joint mediation effort of the Prime Minister and the Field Marshal. The response from Iran was even more enthusiastic. The global impact is our recognition as a middle world power, a country whose voice has to be counted and appreciated, by the vast majority of the international community. The continuation of this acclaimed status will depend on how effectively we address our domestic problems and maintain internal coherence.
Hamid is a senior advocate of the Supreme Court and a former Defense Minister of Pakistan and Governor of the Punjab. He is presently the President of the SOS Children’s Villages of Pakistan.