Various parts of South Asia, most notably Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, have experienced reactive uprisings in recent years, triggered by growing youth dissatisfaction with the state.
The Standard recently interviewed Nepal-based journalist Deepak Adhikari, a former editor of fact-checking outlet South Asia Check, via email to better understand this trend. Excerpts:
We’re seeing youth-led unrest in various South Asian states. How much of this is a shared regional phenomenon versus country-specific grievances?
To some extent, the unrest is regional, but it is still largely country-specific. In Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, young people responded to similar political and governance problems: unemployment, corruption and limited economic opportunities. Those conditions create a shared sense of frustration. But what actually brings people onto the streets tends to be shaped by national contexts and immediate triggers. Each country has its own political dynamics and its own breaking points.
One common thread, however, has been the state response. Governments across the region have shown a tendency to fall back on restrictive or authoritarian measures, including social media bans and crackdowns, which in many ways reinforces the anger rather than containing it.
Are the Gen Z-led protests primarily reactive, being driven by immediate economic and political frustrations, or do they represent a more coherent, long-term ideological shift against systemic corruption?
Most protests are triggered by immediate frustrations, but they point to something deeper. Young people are no longer willing to remain passive observers. Their anger is rooted in lived experience and there is a sense of impatience that distinguishes them from previous generations. They are not willing to wait years for change in the way their parents often did.
This is also the first generation that is truly digital-first. They have the tools to organize, mobilize and amplify their voices online in ways that were not possible before. This digital first campaign has changed the nature of protest itself. In Nepal, TikTok, which was not banned, was flooded with Nepokids and Nepobabies trend, which went viral. It galvanized people to take to the streets. Political leadership in the region, which is still largely dominated by older generations, underestimated this shift.
To what extent has social media empowered Gen Z protesters, and how are governments adapting through censorship, surveillance and-or counter-narratives?
Social media is at the center of all of this. For many young people, it is not just a tool but their primary space for communication and even economic activity. They pay online via QR codes, they run small businesses through it and they use ride-sharing apps for mobility. Most young people in urban Nepal use Facebook, Instagram and TikTok for their daily needs. It is how they organize protests, build networks and articulate their anger.
In Nepal, for instance, when the government moved to block social media platforms, it directly disrupted how young people communicate and mobilize. But such measures are inadequate and sometimes even counterproductive as we saw in Nepal. People quickly find ways around them, often through VPNs. In that sense, attempts to control digital spaces tend to deepen distrust and push dissent into less visible forms rather than eliminate it.
What we have seen is an ongoing adaptation on both sides: Gen Z continues to innovate, while governments try to catch up through restrictions, surveillance and narrative control.
Why do you think Gen Z has emerged as the generation taking action against systemic corruption, when previous generations have also lived under and endured the same conditions?
The prominence of Gen Z comes down to a combination of exposure and expectations. They are the first generation to grow up fully connected, constantly comparing their realities with global standards. They also face a lack of opportunities at home. That gap is very visible to them and they appear less willing to accept it.
They are also less tied to the country’s history and nationalistic narratives that shaped earlier generations, which makes them more willing to question the government and the state’s institutions. Combined with their digital fluency, this gives them both the motivation and the means to act.
Do these demonstrations represent a greater generational disenchantment with political institutions, and is there a possibility of remedying this collapse of trust?
Yes, this is very much a reflection of deeper generational disenchantment. Earlier generations, even when frustrated, tended to operate within the system. They grew up in more rigid societies where institutions—political parties, the state or even authority figures—commanded a certain level of respect. That trust or at least acceptance has eroded.
What’s important, though, is that rebuilding trust is not the responsibility of this generation alone. The burden lies with institutions themselves. They need to demonstrate that they can function, deliver and hold power accountable. Without that, trust cannot be restored simply through appeals or rhetoric.
In many cases, the protest wave has been followed or accompanied by a rise in populist politics. Populist actors often seek to mobilize support by discrediting institutions such as the media or the judiciary. They rely on nationalist rhetoric, simplify complex problems and sometimes construct enemies or false narratives to consolidate power. In doing so, they can end up weakening the very institutions that are needed to rebuild trust.
That is where the role of young protesters becomes critical. Taking to the streets is one part of the process, but sustaining pressure afterward is equally important. In Nepal, for instance, there are early signs that young people are continuing to hold new leaders to account, though it is still early to say. Whether this sustained engagement happens elsewhere in the region will be crucial.
Historically, anti-corruption movements in the region have struggled to produce lasting reform, what would need to be different this time for Gen Z’s efforts to succeed?
I’m cautiously optimistic, but also realistic about the challenges. It is relatively easy to mobilize people and even bring about political change. But it is harder to build institutions and carry out long-term reform.
For this moment to be different, the focus has to shift from protest to governance. That means translating energy on the streets into institutional change. The new leaders must strengthen accountability mechanisms, reform systems and ensure that they do not fall into the same patterns as the old.
The real test occurs after the protests. If the momentum can be sustained and if new leaders resist being absorbed into existing patronage networks, then there is a possibility of meaningful change. But if not, there is always the risk that the cycle repeats itself.