The Trouble with Afghanistan

Rather than declining, as authorities claimed would happen after the exit of U.S.-led forces in August 2021, Pakistan’s problems on its shared border with Afghanistan have ballooned, boosting instability and challenging Islamabad’s writ of the state. Immediately after returning to power, the Afghan Taliban freed over 2,000 members of the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) who had been imprisoned in Afghan jails.

This triggered a resurgence of militancy in Pakistan, as the former convicts filtered back to their homeland, aided by a ceasefire the PTI-led government had inked with the militants. According to data compiled by the independent Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, militancy in the country increased by 56 percent in 2021, with 294 attacks killing 395 people, including 186 civilians and 192 security forces personnel.

The surge in militancy came with indications the Afghan Taliban were disinclined toward becoming Pakistan’s “friendly” neighbors, as their interim defense minister, Mullah Yaqoob, expressed willingness to send army personnel to India for training. This spelled a death knell for Islamabad’s belief of Kabul’s “dependence” on it, a view supported further by Kabul repeatedly asserting Pakistan was “meddling” in its affairs by demanding action against the TTP cadres based on its soil and perpetrating attacks across the Durand Line.

The Taliban have also hinted at not acknowledging the 2,640km Durand Line, with their interim information minister claiming in February 2022 that it remained an “unresolved” issue. He also slammed Pakistan’s border fence, describing it as an attempt to “divide” a nation. This escalation is continuing to play out, with recent statements from Pakistani civilian and military authorities reiterating demands for Kabul to fulfill its commitments under the Doha Agreement and ensure its soil is not used to perpetrate terrorism against any other country. This makes it clear that Pakistan is aware of the threat posed by the current phase of Pak-Afghan ties; how it chooses to respond could well determine the severity of the threat it faces from the TTP in the months and years to come.