In a recent interview, Defense Minister Khawaja Asif warned that terrorist sanctuaries of the outlawed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Afghanistan could be targeted as part of Vision Azm-e-Istehkam, stressing such actions would not be any violation of international law. “The decision about Azm-e-Istehkam is taken because of economic difficulties, and it may also target TTP’s sanctuaries across the border,” he said, emphasizing that almost all terrorism in Pakistan was currently originating from Afghanistan.
Since the launch of the U.S.-led War on Terror in 2001, the Pakistan Army has undertaken several operations against militants, but has failed to achieve a permanent solution, as none of the operations have tackled the underlying structural causes that give rise to militancy in the first place. This is partly because past operations were devised less to address the primary problems and more to appease foreign players in a bid to achieve economic stability. The government claims Azm-e-Istehkam (Resolve of Durable Stability) would prove different and consolidate the nationwide anti-terrorism campaign through cooperation between the center and the provinces.
Traditionally, the federal government, its Intelligence Bureau and the provinces have shunned open cooperation. Lacking a formal structure for collaboration, the ISI and IB rarely share information, and civilian institutions often take a backseat in any anti-terror efforts. This is most prominently highlighted through the failure of the National Counter Terrorism Authority to deliver on government policies, as fragmented bodies established to tackle terrorism failed to act in unison.
The announcement of Azm-e-Istehkam has triggered a fresh wave of questions over why Pakistan has failed to prevent the current terror resurgence. The answer is simple: while we adopted the right short-term tactics to combat militants, we failed in formulating and implementing a long-term anti-terrorism strategy. Can we do it now?