A rudderless Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), lacking the commanding presence of founder Imran Khan, has broken out into competing camps, with each group vying for control of the party by claiming to represent the “true vision” of their incarcerated leader.
Broadly, the PTI currently has two camps: one that believes in mending ties with the establishment; and one that advocates “revolution.” The latter primarily comprises late entrants to the party—people, including lawyers, who joined its ranks after the May 9, 2023 riots that left the party in tatters. The former includes traditional politicians, most of whom are currently in Parliament, or joined the party ahead of the 2018 general elections.
Ahead of, and following, Khan’s arrest in August last year, the party’s “revolutionaries” were in ascendance. Utilizing the party’s unparalleled following on social media, they motivated their supporters to come out in large numbers and vote, despite lacking a unifying electoral symbol and limited public engagements due to the restrictions they faced after the violent May 9 demonstrations. This group remains in the majority, but is gradually losing influence, as disenchanted supporters question their inability to secure Khan’s freedom or mount any significant challenge to the establishment.
The doves in the party are further hampered by the PTI’s eschewing of traditional politics, as Khan built his entire support base off mass demonstrations and sit-ins, most notably the 2014 D-Chowk dharna. Khan’s statements from Adiala Jail validate this, repeatedly expressing willingness to negotiate with the security establishment that helped bring him to power in 2018, but refusing to engage with his political rivals, particularly the PPP and PMLN. Politics is the art of dialogue and this reticence has already led to the party facing off against the state on multiple occasions.
The crux of the problem is Khan’s inability to directly manage his party from behind bars. With limited access to information and the PTI’s leadership, he primarily serves as a detached overseer, issuing directives that his subordinates struggle to accomplish amidst prevailing ground realities. A key example is the D-Chowk protest announced for earlier this month, which Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur claims to have succeeded in delivering—though at the cost of hundreds of arrests and a significant and punishing state response. Meanwhile, the party’s traditional social media strength is proving an albatross, prompting censuring from incumbent leadership. PTI Secretary General Salman Akram Raja earlier this month slammed calls for protests on social media, noting mass arrests cannot help the party fulfill its goals.
The PTI’s public support is undeniable—but this is insufficient for it to achieve its goals. The party would do well to take this time to regroup and resolve dissent or risk frittering away the very popularity that has helped it become a major political force in Pakistan.